

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 113002
ORIGIN SS-25

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APPROVED BY ACDA/MA:TDDAVIES
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 113002

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:YGDS-3

TAGS:PARM, US, UK, UR

SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: UK ROLE IN THE SEPARATE
VERIFICATION AGREEMENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U.S. PAPER HANDED TO BRITISH BY
WARNKE ON MAY 3 (SEPTTEL):

1. BEGIN TEXT: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT
IMPORTANCE TO THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT AS AN
ESSENTIAL MEANS OF PROVIDING CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. IN
APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF THE UK ROLE IN THE SEPARATE
AGREEMENT, WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN GUIDED BY THE OVERRIDING
NEED TO AVOID JEOPARDIZING OR COMPLICATING PROSPECTS FOR
ACHIEVING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SERVE THE BASIC INTERESTS OF THE WEST.

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2. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO SUCH AN
AGREEMENT WOULD BEST BE PROMOTED BY AN APPROACH TO BRITISH
ASSOCIATION THAT WOULD NOT BE SEEN BY THE SOVIETS AS UNDULY
COMPLEX OR AS SUBJECTING THEM TO AN UNEQUAL VERIFICATION
BURDEN. WE HAVE ALSO WELCOMED THE BRITISH DESIRE TO MAKE
A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMEN-

TATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

3. IN FEBRUARY, ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE OUTLINED TO THE BRITISH CTB DELEGATION IN GENEVA OUR PROPOSAL FOR AN ESSENTIALLY BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, WITH THE UK PARTICIPATING IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT VERIFICATION FUNCTIONS IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE U.S. THE APPROACH WAS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT -- NAMELY, TO ESTABLISH A VERIFICATION SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES AN ESSENTIAL BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE CTB BY THE TWO NUCLEAR POWERS WHOSE NUCLEAR FORCES ARE THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE AND WHOSE CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE CTB REGIME IS INDISPENSABLE TO ITS VIABILITY. THE APPROACH WAS ALSO CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE IN THAT, AMONG THE NUCLEAR POWERS LIKELY TO JOIN THE TREATY FROM THE START, ONLY THE U.S. AND USSR HAVE LARGE LAND MASSES WHICH TECHNICALLY JUSTIFY THE TYPE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WHILE MEETING THESE BASIC REQUIREMENTS, THE APPROACH WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE UK WITH A SUBSTANTIAL AND PRACTICAL FORM OF ASSOCIATION, ENABLING IT TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AND INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATION PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND THUS MAKING IT
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POSSIBLE FOR THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS TO BENEFIT FROM U.K. EXPERTISE IN THOSE AREAS.

4. ON APRIL 7, THE UK EMBASSY PROVIDED THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL. THE RESPONSE OUTLINED A MORE EXTENSIVE AND SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ROLE FOR THE UK IN THE AGREEMENT THAN WE HAD PROPOSED. IN PARTICULAR, IN ADDITION TO THE ROLE THE U.S. HAD SUGGESTED FOR BRITISH PERSONNEL IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS ON INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, IT CALLED FOR MAKING THE UK A SIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT AND A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

5. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON GAINING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, AND REMAINS CONCERNED THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS REGARDING THE BRITISH ROLE COULD INVOLVE THE RISK OF COMPLICATING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE. NONETHELESS, IN LIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THIS QUESTION BY BRITISH MINISTERS, WE ARE PREPARED TO REVISE OUR APPROACH ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO INCORPORATE THE UK PROPOSALS.

(1) THE UK WOULD BE A SIGNATORY TO THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO DEVISE FORMULATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD APPROPRIATELY REFLECT THE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED BY THE U.K. UNDER THE AGREEMENT, AS DISTINCT FROM THE FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED BY THE OTHER SIGNATORIES.

(2) THE AGREEMENT WOULD GIVE THE U.S. THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE BRITISH PERSONNEL ON AMERICAN TEAMS INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING ISIS AND CONDUCTING OSIS IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR ESTABLISHING ISIS ON UK TERRITORY. SUCH INSTALLATIONS WOULD NOT BE TECHNICALLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE BASIC VERIFICATION OBJECTIVE
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OF THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD THUS ONLY PLACE AN UNJUSTIFIED FINANCIAL AND PRACTICAL BURDEN ON THE UK AND ON SOVIET INSTALLATION TEAMS.

6. MOREOVER, THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR ESTABLISHING ISIS OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF ANY OF ITS PARTICIPANTS. SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE AND ELSEWHERE COULD OF COURSE MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE) THAT WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. HOWEVER, THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ISDE WILL BE TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE, AND NOT TO MONITOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, THE AUTHENTICATION AND SOPHISTICATED SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED FOR THE VERIFICATION TASK OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR THE ISDE. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR ANY BRITISH OWNED OR OPERATED STATIONS, EITHER IN THE UK OR ELSEWHERE, TO BE COVERED UNDER THE ISI PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE INSTEAD THAT SUCH STATIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE MULTILATERAL ISDE.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OSI PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD APPLY TO U.S. AND SOVIET TERRITORY AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, REQUESTS FOR OSIS UNDER THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. AND USSR. PROVIDING FOR AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT FOR THE UK TO INITIATE OSIS WOULD EITHER IMPOSE AN UNEQUAL VERIFICATION BURDEN ON THE USSR OR MORE PROBABLY LEAD THE USSR TO SEEK AN OSI IN THE WEST FOR EVERY WESTERN REQUEST FOR AN OSI ON SOVIET TERRITORY. SUCH A MULTIPLICATION OF REQUESTS
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ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR, THE U.S. AND U.K. COULD HOLD CONSULTATIONS AND, ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS, THE U.S. COULD FORMALLY REQUEST AN INSPECTION.

(3) THE U.K. WOULD MEET ALL COSTS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF ITS PERSONNEL, BUT WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO U.S. EXPENDITURES UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

(4) THE U.K. WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. AS SUCH, IT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CARRYING OUT OF THE JCC'S FUNCTIONS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY, IN PARTICULAR CASES, TO ESTABLISH SUBSIDIARY BODIES OR TO CONVENE AD HOC MEETINGS WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE ALL MEMBERS. WE WOULD EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH SPECIAL CASES WOULD BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUAL SENSITIVE COMPLIANCE ISSUES. THE U.K. WOULD PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE CONSIDERATION OF BASIC QUESTIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE OF THE TREATY.

8. IF THE UK GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE, WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE U.S. AND UK CTB DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA SHOULD JOINTLY PROPOSE THE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS AND SHOULD WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY IN ORDER TO SECURE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE.

9. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE ABOVE APPROACH LEADS TO COMPLICATIONS OR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH MIGHT JROPARDIZE OUR OBJECTIVE OF AN EFFECTIVE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, WE WOULD OF COURSE WANT TO

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APPROVED BY:S/S-O:MVKENNEDY
PM:JKAHAN

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INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 113002

EXDIS FOR PM DIRECTOR GELB

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 113002 ACTION GENEVA INFO LONDON
MOSCOW MAY 3

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 113002

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TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
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